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Abstract
An increasing number of industries rely on Internet-of-Things devices to track physical resources.
Blockchain technology provides primitives to represent these resources as digital assets on a secure
distributed ledger. Due to the proliferation of blockchain-based assets, there is an increasing need for
a generic mechanism to trade assets between isolated platforms. To date, there is no such mechanism
without reliance on a trusted third party.
In this work, we address this shortcoming and present XChange. XChange mediates trade of any
digital asset between isolated blockchain platforms while limiting the fraud conducted by adversarial
parties. We first describe a generic, five-phase trading protocol that establishes and executes trade
between individuals. This protocol accounts full trade specifications on a separate blockchain. We
then devise a lightweight system architecture, composed of all required components for a generic asset
marketplace.
We implement XChange and conduct real-world experimentation. We leverage an existing,
lightweight blockchain, TrustChain, to account all orders and full trade specifications. By deploying
XChange on multiple low-resource devices, we show that a full trade completes within half a second.
To quantify the scalability of our mechanism, we conduct further experiments on our compute clus-
ter. We conclude that the throughput of XChange, in terms of trades per second, scales linearly with
the system load. Furthermore, we find that XChange exhibits superior throughput and order fulfil
latency compared to related decentralized exchanges, BitShares and Waves.
1 Introduction
Advancements in wireless technology, sensor networks, and hardware capabilities have resulted in expo-
nential growth of low-resource devices operating within the Internet-of-Things (IoT) [1]. IoT technology
holds the potential to address societal challenges such as food security, sustainable agriculture, and re-
newable transportation [2]. Gartner estimates that by 2020, the Internet-of-Things consists of 20 billion
Internet-connected devices worldwide [3].
Many industries have deployed devices for the global traceability of assets, resources, or services. For
example, a smart meter installed at the home of a consumer keeps track of the energy usage of a specific
household and reports these values to the energy provider. Likewise, a GPS tracker installed in taxis
calculates the traveled distance, so the driver knows how much to charge its passengers for a ride. Such
use-cases require an accountability mechanism to securely record the events that influence the state of
an asset, e.g., physical movement or ownership change.
One of the solutions that can bring accountability features to the Internet-of-Things is blockchain
technology. Blockchain is a paradigm to create, manage and transfer digital assets in a tamper-proof
manner. This management is achieved by maintaining a distributed ledger that enables secure recording
of transactions between digital entities, even within the context of mutual distrust. The distributed
ledger, also called a blockchain, is operated by network participants themselves without any dependency
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on trusted third parties. From a business perspective, it fosters collaboration between companies since
it provides the means to securely record interactions and share data.
Various industries are using a blockchain to keep track of assets within their domain. Represent-
ing assets on a distributed blockchain is also called tokenization [4]. The introduction of the Bitcoin
cryptocurrency and the popularity of blockchain technology in general have resulted in a proliferation of
different types of digital assets, fragmented across many blockchain implementations. Currently, almost
200.000 different assets are being managed on the Ethereum blockchain only.1 While there is an abun-
dance of different types of digital assets, there is no generic mechanism to exchange (trade) these assets
between isolated blockchain platforms without the involvement of a trusted third party. We argue that
such a mechanism is a growing necessity, as more industries are relying on blockchain technology and
tokenization of their resources.
We present XChange, a blockchain-based mechanism for generic asset trading in resource-constrained
environments. In stark contrast to existing approaches, XChange enables the exchange of digital assets
between practically any blockchain platform without need for trusted third parties that mediate between
market participants. XChange is highly applicable in situations where many different assets have to be
managed and exchanged. These situations include peer-to-peer energy trading, supply chain management,
and service exchange within the sharing economy.
The key idea of XChange is to account full trade specifications on a blockchain. This accounting
enables traders to accurately track the progress of ongoing trades. A trade in XChange is modelled as a
sequence of unilateral payments (asset transfers) between two trading parties. XChange prevents a trader
from initiating a trade with someone that currently have an obligation to initiate a payment to another
trader during an ongoing trade. This addresses the situation where an adversarial party steals assets by
refusing to initiate a payment back to some counterparty after having received some assets. As a result,
an adversary can only commit this kind of fraud once. To further reduce the gains of adversarial parties,
XChange allows that each trade is divided in multiple payments. We call this mechanism incremental
settlement.
The main contribution of this work is five-fold:
1. The XChange trading protocol which specifies how cross-chain trade between two parties proceeds,
and how fraud conducted by adversaries is limited. (Section 4).
2. A lightweight system architecture for generic, cross-chain trade (Section 5).
3. An improvement of TrustChain [5], the consensus-less blockchain solution used by XChange, that
enables concurrent transactions and increases scalability (Section 6).
4. A fully functional, open source implementation of the XChange trading protocol and system archi-
tecture (Section 7.1).
5. Experimentation around the resource usage and scalability of XChange, conducted on multiple
low-resource devices and our compute cluster (Section 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4).
2 Background and Problem Description
This work focuses on how to trade digital assets that are stored on different blockchains, without the
need for a trusted market operator that mediates in the trading process. We first provide background
on electronic marketplaces and elaborate how blockchain technology enables decentralized asset market-
places. We then formulate the problem description and pose the cardinal research question that this work
answers.
2.1 Electronic Marketplaces
For decades, the ability to facilitate trading at a global scale has been at the core of many established
companies operating on the Internet. In 1995, Craigslist already offered an unmoderated mailing list
where strangers could negotiate, meet, and trade physical goods. eBay formalized the concept of online
1https://etherscan.io/tokens
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trading by introducing a reputation system where buyers and sellers rate each other. More recently, lead-
ing companies acting within the sharing economy, deployed global marketplaces for ride-hailing (Uber),
accommodation (AirBnb), freelance labour (TaskRabbit), and many other services.
The primary responsibility of electronic marketplaces is two-fold. First, market operators have to
ensure a quick and effective mediation between supply and demand. In most electronic marketplaces,
participants create supply and demand by submitting orders to the market operator. In general, literature
distinguishes between two types of orders: offers that indicate the willingness of traders to sell specific
assets, and requests, created by a party interested in specific assets. Electronic marketplaces aggregate
submitted offers and requests, and match them, based on their specifications. This process is also called
order matchmaking. The second responsibility of electronic marketplaces is to execute trade between
traders, as soon as a matching between an offer and a request is found. The market operator either owns
the items subject to trade (e.g., in forex markets), or acts as arbitrator in case of a dispute (e.g. AirBnb).
2.2 Centralized Marketplaces
To date, most electronic marketplaces are operated by a single market owner, responsible for defining
and controlling the environment in which trade is executed [6]. While it is a common practice to deploy
marketplaces with a centralized authority and system architecture, it leads to a few deficiencies in general.
The first problem is that centralized systems tend to be less resistant against infrastructure failures and
targeted attacks (e.g., a denial-of-service attack [7]). Since digital assets are often stored on a single
or a few servers, they pose an interesting target for attackers. Second, the deployed business logic of
(commercial) market operators is rarely open for inspection by traders. The lack of audibility motivates
market owners to exploit their prominent position. For example, it is suspected that Uber manipulates
ride prices with a dynamic pricing mechanism [8].
The emergence of cryptocurrency exchanges, facilitating the trade of blockchain-based assets, further
highlights issues underlying marketplaces under central control [9]. While a few of these exchanges
process transactions worth millions of dollars in total daily, many market operators lack the knowledge or
resources to quickly scale up their infrastructure to meet increasing demand. More than once, the fragile
infrastructure of centralized cryptocurrency exchanges has resulted in poor trading experiences, prolonged
platform unavailability, and even the inability to withdraw assets from digital wallets by users [10]. The
events surrounding the Mt. Gox cryptocurrency exchange in 2014, where hackers compromised Bitcoin
worth around $450 million, demonstrates that inadequate security measures can lead to irreversible
reputational damage.
2.3 Decentralized Marketplaces
The shortcomings of centralized marketplaces motivate the deployment of blockchain-powered decentral-
ized markets, or DEXes. On these DEXes, users can issue, manage and trade digital assets that are
stored on a blockchain. Furthermore, traders remain in full control of their assets, instead of having
them managed by a single market operator. DEXes leverage blockchain technology to transfer ownership
of different types of assets at the same time, without the risk of these assets being compromised by an
adversarial party. Notable DEXes include Waves and BitShares, which obtained a market capitalization
of $80 million and $83 million respectively at the time of writing [11] [12]. To date, there are more than
250 DEXes and over than 4.000 active traders across all DEXes [13].
A common characteristic of DEXes is that all orders created by traders are stored and processed on
a blockchain. To match compatible offers and requests, DEXes either execute matchmaking logic during
transaction validation or they rely on a centralized server to conduct order matchmaking. Although the
market volume of DEXes is increasing, a DEX is limited to facilitate the trade of assets that are stored
on its underlying blockchain.
2.4 Asset Trading Between Different Blockchains
Centralized cryptocurrency exchanges are able to trade assets stored on different blockchains through
intermediate wallets owned by the market operator. However, there are increasing trust issues around
the companies operating these cryptocurrency exchanges [14]. Although DEXes enable trust-less asset
exchange without trusted third party, the trading is limited to assets managed on the blockchain used
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by a specific DEX. The exchange of digital assets residing in two different blockchain platforms, e.g.,
exchanging Bitcoin and Ethereum assets, is a non-trivial problem.
The atomic swap protocol addresses the problem of exchanging assets between different blockchains,
without need for a trusted third party [15]. Atomic swaps enable two parties to exchange blockchain-
based assets in an atomic manner: the asset exchange either succeeds or fails for both parties at any given
time. The key technology underlying the atomic swap protocol is the Hashed Time-locked Contract, or
HTLC [16]. This is a special type of blockchain transaction where a party must provide a pre-image
of a cryptographic hash before some deadline, usually 24 hours, in order to claim his or her assets. If
this deadline is exceeded and a party did not provide the pre-image, the assets go back to the original
owner. Atomic swaps eliminate the counterparty risk of losing assets to an adversarial trader while
trading. Counterparty risk is a serious concern in many electronic marketplaces that facilitate peer-to-
peer trading [17].
Although atomic swaps enable risk-free and cross-chain trading, we identify two deficiencies. First,
atomic swaps only work when trading assets between blockchains with support for specific programming
constructs. An atomic swap involving a blockchain platform without support for HTLCs is not possible.
Second, the atomic swap protocol is complicated to implement, and a single implementation mistake can
result in the loss of funds. We aim for a generic, cross-chain trading solution that does not rely on the
availability of specialized transaction types.
2.5 Problem Description
In this work, we address the challenging problem of generic trade of digital assets between different
blockchain platforms. Due to the proliferation of blockchain-based assets, we believe that the availability
of such a trading mechanism is becoming a necessity. Based on the aforementioned deficiencies of existing
centralized and decentralized marketplaces, we formulate three requirements for our cross-chain trading
mechanism:
1. Generic. We require that our trading mechanism enables generic trade of assets between different
blockchain platforms. In particular, the trade of assets with our mechanism should not be limited
to a selected number of blockchain architectures with specific design requirements. We do not
consider the atomic swap protocol an adequate solution for such a trading mechanism since it
requires support for HTLCs.
2. Decentralized. We require that the architecture of our trading mechanism is decentralized, and
that users themselves remain in control of the assets involved in a trade. More specifically, decen-
tralization in the context of this work is achieved when there is not a single authority that controls
the environment in which order matchmaking and trade execution take place. Trade should emerge
and proceed through direct information exchange between traders and peer-to-peer payments.
3. Limited counterparty risk. During a trade, a counterparty might actively try to fraud the other
party for economic benefit. In centralized marketplaces, counterparty risk is usually addressed
by the (trusted) market operator which mediates the asset exchange between two parties. In
decentralized marketplaces, counterparty risk is reduced since blockchain technology allows a trust-
less transfer of assets. Our solution requires adequate measures to limit counterparty risk while
trading.
These requirements directly lead to the following research question: how can we devise a generic and
decentralized mechanism to trade assets that are stored on different blockchains, with limited counterparty
risk?
3 Solution Outline
In this section, we outline our solution for generic, cross-chain asset trading. During the following example,
we assume that two traders, Alice and Bob, exchange blockchain-based assets. Prior to the actual asset
exchange, they have signed a contractual agreement containing all details of the upcoming trade. These
details include the negotiated exchange price and wallet addresses, and is further explained in Section 4.
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Figure 1: High-level overview of our XChange trading mechanism. In this example, Alice trades her
Bitcoin for Bob’s Ethereum tokens. Full trade specifications are stored on a separate blockchain.
The trade agreement between Alice and Bob is public and can be inspected by anyone. Assume that Alice
wants to sell her Bitcoin (BTC) to Bob, in return for some of his Ethereum gas (ETH). A peer-to-peer
asset exchange involves at least a transfer of BTC assets from the Bitcoin wallet of Alice to the Bitcoin
wallet of Bob, and a transfer of ETH assets from the Ethereum wallet of Bob to the Ethereum wallet of
Alice.
3.1 Naive Approach
We first consider a naive approach to trade the BTC and ETH assets between Alice and Bob, without
any trusted third party. W.l.o.g., we assume that Alice initiates the trading process and has to initiate
the trade by sending assets to Bob. She does so by submitting a transaction to the Bitcoin blockchain
which transfers BTC assets from her Bitcoin wallet to the Bitcoin wallet of Bob. When this transaction
is included on the blockchain, she notifies Bob about the conducted payment. As soon as Bob verifies
that the BTC arrived his Bitcoin wallet, he initiates a transfer of ETH from his Ethereum wallet to
the Ethereum wallet of Alice. Both these asset transfers are included as individual transactions in the
Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains, and are publicly visible to other interested parties. Therefore, others
can verify that all assets have been transferred between Alice and Bob and that both parties fulfilled
all obligations as specified in the trade agreement. The exchange of assets during a trade is also called
settlement.
A major problem with this trade procedure, however, is that Bob can commit counterparty fraud by
simply refusing to transfer his ETH to Alice as soon as Alice has transferred her BTC to him. Likewise,
if Bob would initiate the first payment to Alice, Bob is exposed to the counterparty risk of losing his
ETH to Alice. Centralized exchanges usually address this counterparty risk by active mediation during
an asset exchange between two parties. In this situation, both Alice and Bob transfer their BTC and
ETH respectively to wallets owned by the market operator. The market operator then transfers the BTC
assets to the Bitcoin wallet of Bob and the ETH assets to the Ethereum wallet of Alice.
3.2 Our Solution
This work aims to limit counterparty risk during the asset exchange process by relying on accountability.
The key idea of our trading mechanism, called XChange, is to store full specifications of each trade on
a separate blockchain. Our approach is visualized in Figure 1, which shows (parts of) the Bitcoin and
Ethereum blockchain in the lower part of the figure, and the separate blockchain used by XChange in the
upper part of the figure. Technical requirements of the XChange blockchain are discussed in Section 6,
and for now we assume that this blockchain is capable of storing arbitrary data elements in a secure
manner.
The trade between Alice and Bob now proceeds as follows: first, one of the parties publishes the
dual-signed trade agreement on the XChange blockchain (in Figure 1, this agreement is included in the
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block with sequence number 68.356). Next, the settlement process starts, and Alice and Bob initiate
payments to each other. W.l.o.g., assume Alice starts the trade by initiating a transaction to send her
BTC to the Bitcoin wallet of Bob. In Figure 1, this transaction is included in the block with sequence
number 486 on the Bitcoin blockchain. Next, Alice records this payment within a transaction on the
XChange blockchain, which includes the identifier of the transfer transaction on the Bitcoin blockchain.
When Bob wants to verify that Alice has indeed transferred the BTC to his Bitcoin wallet, he can inspect
the BTC transaction and check it for validity and finality. When Bob has confirmed that Alice indeed
sent the BTC to his Bitcoin wallet, he initiates a payment to Alice by submitting a transaction to the
Ethereum blockchain. In Figure 1, this transaction is included in the block with sequence number 9.868
on the Ethereum blockchain. Next, Bob records this payment within a transaction on the XChange
blockchain. Alice now verifies whether Bob has sent the promised ETH assets to her Ethereum wallet. If
so, both parties explicitly publish a transaction on the XChange blockchain (e.g. block 68359 in Figure 1)
to indicate that the trade has completed successfully.
Note that the above solution requires that the assets subjected to a trade can be publicly traced. We
believe this is not a major limitation since ownership change of a vast majority of blockchain-based assets
is public information. Furthermore, we assume that Alice and Bob can query the transaction in both the
Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchain, e.g., by requesting the required information from a node that knows
about all transactions on a specific blockchain (often referred to as a full node). We consider privacy
concerns beyond the scope of this work since they also apply to existing decentralized exchange solutions.
3.3 Limiting Counterparty Risk
An important observation is that the above mechanism does not address counterparty risk when trading
without trusted intermediary. Our solution is still vulnerable when an adversary does not fulfil their
obligations and steals assets from a counterparty. Therefore, we extend our solution with two risk
mitigation strategies:
1. Limiting the number of outstanding trades with risky parties. XChange relies on full
accounting of trade specifications to limit the number of outstanding trades with risky parties.
A party is considered risky if it is currently responsible for the next payment during an ongoing
trade. By careful inspection of the information on the XChange blockchain, others can determine
whether a specific party currently holds such a responsibility. If so, the inspecting party should
refuse to trade with the party that holds responsibility. If all participants adhere to this strategy,
an adversarial party can only commit counterparty fraud once. Before others engage in a trade with
a risky party, it must pass on the responsibility to a counterparty by initiating the next payment
during an ongoing trade. Nonetheless, a trader can still start a trade at its own risk with a party
that holds responsibility in a trade, e.g., with parties that a trader trusts.
2. Incremental settlement. In the example given above, a trade between Alice and Bob consists
of two payments in total: one that transfers BTC assets and one that transfers ETH assets. To
further reduce counterparty risk, we can incrementally settle the trade by dividing each payment in
n partial payments (n defaults to one). The value of n should be included in the trade agreement.
For example, with n = 2, Alice first sends half of the agreed amount of BTC to Bob. Bob then
sends half of the agreed amount of ETH to Alice. Incremental settlement decreases the economic
benefit for adversarial parties when committing counterparty fraud, but prolongs the trade duration
since more payments have to be made.
The implementation of the XChange trading mechanism compromises of a five-phase trading protocol
and a system architecture. The formal specifications of the trading protocol are given in the next section
whereas the system architecture of XChange is elaborated in Section 5.
4 The XChange Trading Protocol
In this section, we present the XChange trading protocol for generic asset trading between isolated
blockchains. The protocol describes how matchmakers match new orders submitted by traders, and
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coordinates the execution of a trade between trading parties. The protocol design is based on five
assumptions, which are stated below:
1. Strong identities. The digital identity of each peer uniquely identifies a specific end-device in the
network. Well-established digital identities are necessary to prevent misbehaviours such as a Sybil
Attack and a distributed denial-of-service attack [18][19]. This is not an unrealistic assumption since
many electronic marketplaces already impose some form of identity validation. Well-established
digital identities are supported at the things layer of IoT systems [20].
2. Public-private keys. Each peer in the network is in possession of a cryptographical key pair,
consisting of a public and a private key. The public key PKp of a specific peer p is known to other
peers and uniquely identifies this peer in the network. Their private key, SKp, is used to digitally
sign data such as outgoing messages and new orders. We assume that adversarial parties cannot
forge digital signatures.
3. Reliable network. The transport layer of the network guarantees that messages eventually arrive
their destinations if resubmitted often enough.
4. Availability. Traders remain online while their orders are being matched and fulfilled. Since
traders have an incentive to remain online to get their orders fulfilled, we believe this is a realistic
assumption.
5. XChange blockchain. Full trade specifications are stored on the XChange blockchain. This
blockchain is denoted by B during the protocol description.
Besides storing trade specifications on B, XChange maintains an off-chain network where traders
negotiate trade and matchmakers bring traders together. Matchmakers bundle unfulfilled orders they
know about in their order books, and inform traders of potential trading partners. An order book is
an efficient data structure that stores orders and is optimized for finding the set of matching orders for
an incoming order. Every trader can act as a matchmaker within the XChange network at the cost of
increased resource (to maintain an order book) and increased bandwidth usage (to process the orders
sent by traders). We denote the set of all available matchmakers in the network by M. Our off-chain
order book follows the decentralized approach adopted by the trading protocols AirSwap and 0x [21][22].
Specifically, each trader sends a new order to one or more matchmakers. The focus of this work is on the
trading mechanism and we provide a full analysis of decentralized matchmaking in our ongoing work.2
We now elaborate on each of the five phases during the XChange trading protocol.
3) send
MatchMatchmakers
1) broadcast Order 2) broadcast Order
Trader Trader
Figure 2: Phase I of the XChange trading protocol: traders (depicted in green and red) send new orders
to matchmakers (shown in blue). Matchmakers notify traders about matches for their orders.
4.1 Phase I: Order Creation and Matching
During the first phase of the XChange protocol, traders create new orders (offers and requests) and
send these orders to matchmakers. Matchmakers match incoming orders with existing orders in the order
book, and notify order creators about trading opportunities. Figure 2 visualizes the operations performed
by traders and matchmakers during this phase, and Listing 1 lists the pseudo-code associated with this
phase.
2Omitted due to ongoing double-blind review, available on request.
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1 Procedure create_order(timeout, asset pair):
2 O ← (id, seq, timestamp, timeout, asset pair)
3 send Order(O) to m ⊆M
4
5 Procedure cancel_order(O):
6 send CancelOrder(O.id, O.seq) to m ⊆M
7
8 On receive of Order(O) or CancelOrder(id, seq) message by peer p:
9 i f message.type is Order and validate(O):
10 insert O in order book
11 find matches in order book(O)
12 else i f message.type is CancelOrder:
13 remove (id, seq) from order book
14
15 Procedure find_matches_in_order_book(O)
16 M ← matches(order_book , O)
17 foreach Om in M :
18 send Match(O,Om) to O.id
19
20 On receive of Match(O,Om) message from m by peer p:
21 i f p.has trade interest(O,Om)
22 put Match(O,Om) into match queues[O]
23 else :
24 send RejectMatch(O,Om, reason) to m
25
26 On Timeout of match queues[O]:
27 select trader from queue(O)
28
29 Procedure select_trader_from_queue(O):
30 counterparty ← select(match queues[O])
31 verify trader(O, counterparty) # See phase II
32
33 On receive of RejectMatch(O,Om, reason) message:
34 update order book(O, reason)
35 find matches in order book(O)
Listing 1: Phase I: Order creation and matching.
When a trader intends to exchange assets that it holds with assets that it wants to have, it creates a
new order by calling the create order procedure (line 1, Listing 1). Each order O created by trader t is
uniquely identified by (PKt, Oind) where PKt is the public key of t and Oind is an ordinal positive integer
indicating the order’s position in the sequence of all orders of t. Furthermore, O contains a timestamp,
indicating when the order has been created, a timeout, which specifies how long the order should remain
valid, and a boolean value indicating whether the order is an offer or a request. Inclusion of the timeout
prevents orders from being open for an indefinite amount of time. The content of O is digitally signed by
t with SKt, to ensure non-repudiation and authenticity. Finally, O contains specifications on the assets
that t desires to buy or sell. This information is provided as a tuple of assets, or an asset pair. If Alice
wants to sell 1 BTC for 1 ETH, she creates an offer with asset pair (1 BTC, 1 ETH). Similarly, if Bob
wants to buy 1 ETH for 1 BTC, he creates a request with asset pair (1 BTC, 1 ETH). The order creator
includes the new order in a Order message and disseminates it to a subset of all matchmakers (line 6),
according to an order dissemination policy (see Section 5.2).
Traders are able to cancel an unfulfilled order O by sending a (signed) CancelOrder message with Oind
to matchmakers (line 6). If a matchmaker receives such a message, it immediately deletes the cancelled
order from its order book (line 13).
When a matchmaker m receives an Order message (line 9), it extracts the order from the incoming
message, validates its digital signature, and assesses correctness of the incoming order according to an
order validation policy (see Section 5.2). If the incoming order is invalid or expired, m discards it and
does not consider it for matching. If the incoming order is valid, it will be inserted in the order book of m
and immediately matched with any existing orders with a mutual interest (line 16). If the matchmaker
establishes a match, it informs the trader that created the incoming order about the trade potential.
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In the situation that an order matches multiple orders, each matched order couple is considered as a
different prospective trade. For instance, if an order of a trader t matches with n reciprocal orders, there
are n potential trades in question, each of which includes t as one trading partner. For each established
match, the matchmaker sends a Match message to the trader that creates the incoming order (line 18).
A Match message contains full details on the matched orders.
The receiver of a Match message is called the initiator. The initiator fulfils an important role if the
match leads to a trade. When trader t receives a Match message from m, it first checks whether its order
is still valid, i.e., whether it still has an interest in trading the respective assets. If so, it remembers the
matched order by adding it to a queue (line 22). Otherwise, t sends a RejectMatch message back to m
with a reason (line 24). Upon reception of a RejectMatch by a matchmaker, it updates the status of the
respective orders in their order book (line 34) and attempts to find new matches (line 35).
For each order, a trader t maintains a match priority queue which contains the set of matched counter-
parties, nominated by matchmakers to t. Each trader can have its own decision mechanism to select one
trader amongst the others in the match priority queue. An example decision mechanism would be to set a
timer for the order and select the trader who has been nominated by the highest number of matchmakers
when the timer expires. We motivate and elaborate on matching priority queues in Section 5.7. We call
the trader selected from the matching queue the counterparty of a prospective trade. Once t selects a
counterparty, phase II of the XChange trading protocol starts and the initiator verifies the counterparty
(line 31). Furthermore, the initiator reserves (“locks”) these assets to the counterparty which prevents
the situation where it would incorrectly respond to a TradeProposal message for a specific order while
having an outstanding trade proposal for the same order.
#3
2) send TradeProposal
3..n) send Negotiate
n) send TradeAccept/TradeReject
Initiator Counterparty
#4
XChange blockchain
1) verify
counterparty
Figure 3: Phase II of the XChange protocol: two matched traders negotiate a trade.
4.2 Phase II: Trade Negotiation
The second phase of the XChange trading protocol is illustrated in Figure 3 and formalized in Listing
2. During this phase, traders carry out off-chain trade negotiation with a sequence of network messages,
without the involvement of matchmakers or other parties. When an initiator has selected a counterparty
for a potential trade, it first validates the counterparty by checking whether it holds responsibility during
one of its ongoing trades (line 2, Listing 2). Recall that a counterparty holds responsibility if it is their
turn to initiate a payment to another party during an ongoing trade. This can be verified by inspection of
the transactions on B that involves the counterparty. Note that the presence of a Payment transaction
on B is not enough to ensure that a party has actually transferred the promised assets. Further inspection
of the transaction identifier inside the Payment transaction is necessary, which involves a transaction
lookup in another blockchain. An initiator following the XChange trading protocol will not engage
in a trade with a counterparty that holds some responsibility. This is a crucial property to address
counterparty fraud in XChange.
If the initiator wishes to trade with a counterparty after the verification of their responsibilities, it
sends a TradeProposal message (line 3). This message contains the order of the initiator, the identifier
of the (matched) order of the counterparty, and a trade proposal. When the counterparty receives a
TradeProposal, it has a chance to negotiate by sending Negotiate message back to the initiator (line
15). This might happen when the counterparty already fulfilled a part of their order and the initiator
9
1 Procedure verify_trader(O, counterparty):
2 i f check responsibilities(counterparty,B)
3 send TradeProposal(proposal) to counterparty
4 remove counterparty from match queues[O]
5 else
6 select trader from queue(O)
7
8 On receive of TradeProposal(proposal) or Negotiate(proposal) message by peer p:
9 result ← evaluate(msg.proposal)
10 i f result = ACCEPT:
11 send TradeAccept(proposal) to msg.sender
12 i f p is initiator:
13 start_trade ()
14 i f result = NEGOTIATE:
15 send Negotiate(proposal) to msg.sender
16 i f result = REJECT:
17 send TradeReject(proposal) to msg.sender
18 i f p is initiator:
19 send RejectMatch(proposal.O, proposal.Om, reason) to m ⊆M
20 select trader from queue(O)
21
22 On receive of TradeReject(proposal) message:
23 i f initiator:
24 send RejectMatch(proposal.O, proposal.Om, reason) to m ⊆M
25 select trader from queue(O)
26
27 On receive of TradeAccept(proposal) message by peer p:
28 i f p is initiator:
29 construct trade agreement(proposal) # See phase III
Listing 2: Phase II: Trade negotiation.
proposes to trade more assets than the counterparty is willing to. This situation could occur if the
matchmaker has outdated information on the status of the counterparty’s order.
Trade negotiation may continue by an exchange of Negotiate messages between the initiator and
the counterparty, until one of the two sides eventually accept or reject the last negotiation offer by
a TradeAccept or TradeReject message, respectively. If one of the parties has sent a TradeAccept
message, the initiator immediately starts the preparation of trade, entering phase III of the trading
protocol (line 29). In the situation where one side has sent TradeReject message, the initiator will send
a RejectMatch message to the matchmaker to inform them about the failed negotiation, and select a
new counterparty from the match priority queue, if available (lines 19 and 25). The outcome of the
negotiation phase is an asset pair which specifies which and how many assets will be exchange between
the involved traders.
1) send PartialAgreement
2) send Agreement
#3 #4
XChange blockchain
3) publish
Agreement
CounterpartyInitiator
Figure 4: Phase III of the XChange protocol: the initiator and counterparty construct a trade agreement,
which is published on the XChange blockchain by the initiator.
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1 Procedure construct_trade_agreement(proposal)
2 Apartial ← proposal.to agreement()
3 Apartial.add wallet info()
4 send PartialAgreement(Apartial) to proposal.counterparty
5
6 On receive of PartialAgreement(Apartial) message:
7 A← A.add wallet info()
8 send Agreement to Apartial.initiator
9
10 On receive of Agreement(A) message:
11 B.publish(A)
12 trade← A.to trade()
13 insert trade in trades
14 send payment(trade) # See phase IV
Listing 3: Phase III: Constructing a trade agreement between an initiator and a counterparty.
1 Procedure send_payment(trade)
2 payment← trade.get next payment()
3 payment.txid← conduct payment(payment) # Transfer assets on blockchain
4 B.publish(payment)
5 send Payment(payment) to trade.counterparty
6 i f trade.complete():
7 construct trade done(trade) # See phase V
8
9 On receive of Payment(payment) message by peer p:
10 trade← payment.trade id
11 valid← payment.validate() # Is the payment initiated by the other side?
12 i f valid and not trade.complete():
13 send payment(trade)
14 elif valid and trade.complete() and is initiator:
15 construct trade done(trade) # See phase V
Listing 4: Phases IV: Execution of a trade.
4.3 Phase III: Constructing a Trade Agreement
In the third phase of the trading protocol, traders enter into an irrevocable trade agreement and publish
this agreement on the XChange blockchain. This phase is visualized in Figure 4 and formalized in Listing
3.
When one of the parties accept the trade proposal, the initiator starts the third phase of the trading
protocol by constructing a partial trade agreement, including local information regarding the upcoming
trade (line 1, Listing 3). This information includes the wallet address(es) of the initiator where the
counterparty is expected to send assets to, the public keys (identifiers) of both traders, and the asset
pair that is negotiated during the negotiation phase. The trade agreement also contains information on
whether incremental settlement is used, and if so, the number of expected payments originating from
each side. The initiator embeds this information in a PartialAgreement message, signs it, and sends
to the counterparty (line 4). When the counterparty receives the PartialAgreement message, it verifies
the included information and creates an Agreement message which includes the wallet address(es) of the
counterparty (line 6-8). The counterparty signs the Agreement message and sends it back to the initiator,
who then publishes the dual-signed trade agreement on B (line 11). Each trade agreement contains a
publication deadline. If the trade agreement is published on B after the publication deadline passed, the
trade agreement is considered invalid. Inclusion of this deadline addresses the attack scenario where an
initiator purposefully withholds a dual-signed trade agreement to avoid taking responsibility in the trade
specified by the agreement.
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6) send Payment
3) send Payment
Bitcoin blockchain Ethereum blockchain
1) transfer
assets
2) publish
Payment 4) transferassets
5) publish
Payment
#3 #4
XChange blockchain
Initiator Counterparty
Figure 5: Phase IV of the XChange protocol: The trade is executed by a sequence of payments. In this
figure, Bitcoin are exchanged with Ethereum assets, and the trade consists of two payments.
4.4 Phase IV: Trade Execution
During the fourth phase of the XChange trading protocol, parties execute the trade and exchange assets
in accordance with the trade agreement. This phase is visualized in Figure 5 and the pseudo-code is
provided in Listing 4.
A trade usually consists of two payments (asset transfers), but more payments are required if the
parties agreed on using incremental settlement. The initiator always has the responsibility to make
the first payment in a trade. The initiator initiates a payment p by initiating an asset transfer on the
blockchain that hosts the assets subject to trade (line 3, Listing 4). This should result in a transaction
identifier associated with the payment, say txp. The initiator then publishes the payment information on
B which includes txp. The Payment transaction contains sufficient information for the counterparty to
assess whether the initiator actually made the payment. The transaction also includes a reference to the
trade agreement. The initiator then sends a Payment message to the counterparty to inform them about
the payment (line 5). The counterparty now polls its asset wallet to verify whether the promised assets
have arrived (line 11). If so, the counterparty initiates a payment back to the initiator. This process
repeats until all payments have been made and all assets have been transferred between the initiator
and the counterparty. At that point, the initiator finalizes the trade during the last phase of the trading
protocol (lines 7 and 15).
3) publish
TradeDone
Matchmakers
4) broadcast TradeDone 5) broadcast
TradeDone
#3 #4
XChange blockchain
1) send PartialTradeDone
2) send TradeDone
Figure 6: Phase V of the XChange protocol: The trade is finalized and matchmakers are informed about
the conducted trade.
12
1 Procedure construct_trade_done(trade)
2 Dpartial ← trade.to trade done()
3 send PartialTradeDone(Dpartial) to trade.counterparty
4
5 On receive of PartialTradeDone(Dpartial) message by peer p:
6 D ← p.sign(Dpartial)
7 send TradeDone(D) to m ⊆M
8 send TradeDone(D) to trade.initiator
9
10 On receive of TradeDone(D) message:
11 B.publish(D)
12 send TradeDone(D) to m ⊆M
13
14 On receive of TradeDone(D) message by matchmaker m:
15 update order book(D)
Listing 5: Phases V: Finalization of a trade.
4.5 Phase V: Trade Finalization
Once both parties have completed all payments and have created the Payment transaction on B, they fi-
nalize the trade using a dual-signed transaction. XChange explicitly finalizes, or “closes” a trade between
two parties in order for others to quickly verify that a trade has been completed successfully, without
having to verify individual Payment transactions. This process is visualized in Figure 6 and the associ-
ated pseudo-code is given in Listing 5. The initiator of a trade first sends a signed PartialTradeDone
message to the counterparty (line 3, Listing 5). This message is sent to the counterparty and contains
the identifiers of the Agreement and all Payment transactions included on B. Upon reception of this
message by the counterparty, it signs the partial PartialTradeDone (line 6) and informs the matchmak-
ers about the completed trade (line 8). The counterparty then sends a TradeDone message back to the
initiator (line 7). When the initiator receives this message, it publishes the dual-signed trade finalization
in a TradeDone message on B (line 11) and informs matchmakers about the completed trade (line 12).
When a matchmaker receives a TradeDone message, it updates the status of the orders of the initiator
and counterparty in their order book.
4.6 Security Analysis
We now present a basic security analysis of the XChange trading protocol and analyse the consequences
of an adversarial trader that diverts from the protocol. We leave a discussion of the security guarantees of
the blockchain used by XChange to other work since these guarantees highly depend on the specifications
of B. The following analysis highlights potential attacks during the XChange trading protocol where an
adversarial party attempts to purposefully compromise assets or stale the activity of ongoing trades.
Order creation and matching (phase I). During the first phase, matchmakers may intentionally
match orders according to their own desires. For example, a matchmaker could give preferential treatment
to orders made by specific traders, and report better matches for their orders. However, since a trader
disseminates new orders to multiple matchmakers simultaneously, there is a high probability that at least
one matchmaker honestly reports matches back to the trader. This probability increases if the order is
sent to more matchmakers after its creation.
Trade negotiation (phase II). During the second phase, a trader first verifies the responsibilities
of a counterparty before sending out a TradeProposal message. This is a key mechanism to limit
counterparty fraud. If t skips this verification, it opens a window of opportunity for the counterparty
to commit fraud with multiple parties simultaneously, including t. If t acts rational, it is in their best
interest to perform this verification by inspecting the outstanding trades of the counterparty to lower the
risk of losing assets.
During the trade negotiation, any party can leave ongoing negotiations without repercussions by
sending a TradeReject message to the other side. This includes the situation where one of the parties
does not respond with a Negotiate or TradeAccept message in a timely manner. The party that left
the negotiations can now start new negotiations with another potential trading partner.
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Constructing a trade agreement (phase III). While constructing a trade agreement, the initiator
does have an incentive to defer the publication of a dual-signed trade agreement on B. Specifically, as soon
as the trade agreement is published on B, the initiator takes on responsibility during the agreed trade.
Inspection of the responsibilities of the initiator by others will reveal his position in the agreed trade, and
other parties will refuse to trade with the initiator. To ensure that the initiator publishes the agreement
in a timely manner on B, the trade agreement contains a publication deadline (see Section 4.3). A trade
agreement published after its publication deadline by the initiator is considered invalid by others, and the
two parties that signed the expired agreement will not continue to the next phase of the trading protocol.
The publication deadline also forces the counterparty to respond to an incoming PartialAgreement
message in a timely manner.
Trade execution (phase IV). During trade execution, a trader t might refrain from initiating a
payment to the counterparty after having received assets from the counterparty. However, other rational
traders will not engage in a trade with t until t has passed on its responsibility. Since XChange assumes
that the identity of each trader is verified, t cannot easily re-enter the network under a new identity when
it has committed fraud. Also note that rational traders are not likely to refrain from publishing their
Payment transaction on B, since doing so will pass on their responsibility during an ongoing trade.
Trade finalization (phase V). When a trade between two parties enters the finalization phase (see
Section 4.5), all required payments have been made and all required Payment transactions have been
published on B. Even if one of the parties actively delays the finalization phase, others can still assess
that the trade has been completed by inspection of the last Payment transaction.
5 The XChange System Architecture
We now present the XChange system architecture, visualized in Figure 7. Each active peer in the XChange
network runs a single implementation of this system architecture as a shared library. We briefly explain
each component and highlight how interaction proceeds between components.
5.1 Network Layer
The network layer passes incoming messages to the overlay logic and routes outgoing messages to their
intended destination. This layer can be implemented using any networking library with support for peer-
to-peer communication (for example, libp2p3). The XChange trading protocol does not make assumptions
about the topology of the network layer, except for the fact that each peer should know the network
address of some matchmakers that can match their orders. In our implementation, we use a bootstrapping
mechanism where new peers in the network immediately attempt to discover some available matchmakers.
The networking library manages this bootstrapping process. Attacks targeted at the network layer (e.g.,
the Eclipse Attack [23]) are beyond the scope of this work. The Sybil Attack is addressed by the
requirement for strong identities, as discussed in Section 4.
5.2 Overlay Logic
The XChange overlay logic (depicted in blue in Figure 7) reacts to incoming network messages and
optionally passes the information in these messages to the relevant components. For example, an incoming
order (embedded in an Order message) is passed to the order book and stored there. Similarly, the
information in an incoming Match message is passed to the match priority queue. The overlay logic
interacts with the trade execution engine when a new trade is about to start, e.g., when receiving a
TradeAccept message. It also passes information about an incoming Payment message to the trade
execution engine. The overlay logic defines three different policy types, for order dissemination, order
validation, and (trade) clearing. These policies are explained next.
Dissemination policy. The dissemination policy specifies how a new order is disseminated to
matchmakers. It contains information to which matchmakers a new order should be send. The num-
ber of matchmakers that receive a new order is also called the order fanout. Sending a new order to
3https://libp2p.io
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Figure 7: The system architecture of XChange, our mechanism for generic trade at scale. Arrows between
two components indicate interaction or data exchange.
more matchmakers potentially speeds up the matching of this order, but it also increases the load on
matchmakers since they have to process more incoming Order messages.
Clearing Policies. The clearing policies predicate whether a specific peer should send out a trade
proposal to another trader, or accept an incoming trade proposal that it received (during phase II of
the XChange trading protocol, see Section 4.2). XChange enables programmers to define distinct and
multiple clearing policies for orders with differing specifications. For example, a clearing policy could
specify that a trader can only exchange assets with other traders that are within geographic proximity.
Another clearing policy could implement trading restrictions governed by regional or local legislation. We
have implemented the strategy that a trader only interacts with traders to do not hold any responsibility
during trade as a clearing policy. This policy is enabled by default.
Validation Policies. The validation policies implement validation rules for new incoming orders.
Similar to the clearing policies, multiple validation policies can be applied to orders with differing spec-
ifications. An order validation policy often takes into consideration the information in each order and
determines whether this attribute data is valid with respect to a specific domain (e.g. whether the quan-
tity of stocks is non-negative). The overlay logic immediately discards orders that are classified as invalid
by any applied validation policy.
5.3 XChange Blockchain
The XChange trading protocol assumes the availability of a blockchain on which full trade specifications
are stored. The popularity of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency bootstrapped the development of an extensive
range of blockchain platforms with varying security and performance guarantees. Most of these ledgers
are designed to securely manage and transfer cryptocurrencies or digital tokens. The distributed ledger
used by XChange does not necessarily need the required security level of managing digital currencies.
Instead, we require a blockchain that merely allows for the tamper-proof storage of trade specifications.
We explore suitable blockchains for the XChange trading mechanism in Section 7.1.
5.4 Order Book
An order book is a data structure that stores (active) orders. It lists the specific assets that are being
bought or sold within the market and provides traders with a convenient view of the current supply and
demand. Depending on the trading environment, orders in the order book often contains the identity
of its creator, and sometimes the reputation scores of the order creator (for instance, eBay shows the
trustworthiness of merchants). When presenting an order book to traders, orders are usually sorted on
one or more attributes, e.g., based on their price. For orders with pricing information attached, the order
book usually lists the “best” orders at the top.
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In XChange, each matchmaker can operate multiple order books for different order types (coloured
green in Figure 7). Specifically, orders exchanging the same asset pair are stored in the same order book.
An asset pair specifies the pair of assets that are being traded in an order book and uniquely identifies
each order book. For example, an order book identified by the BTC/ETH asset pair contains orders that
buy or sell Bitcoin and Ethereum gas. Maintaining distinct order books at the same time enables order
management with a single infrastructure across different trading domains.
5.5 Matching Engine
The matching engine (coloured red in Figure 7) matches incoming new orders with existing orders in
order books. Marketplaces operated by a central authority often deploy an in-house order matching
engine, fully controlled by the market operator. DEXes sometimes integrate the order matching process
in the transaction validation process. In XChange, each matchmaker operates a matching engine and
immediately attempts to match new incoming orders. Established matches for an incoming order are
passed to the overlay logic, embedded in a Match message and sent to the order creator.
The matching engine can contain multiple matching policies. A matching policy predicates whether an
offer and request match, and is applied to a single type of order book. It takes a single offer and request
as input and determines whether these orders match, based on their specifications. In the context of
cryptocurrency trading, whether two orders match depends on the asset price contained in the order.
The most common matching strategy in financial markets is the price-time matching strategy, where
orders are first matched based on their price, and then based on order creation time in case of a tie-
breaker (older orders are prioritized). XChange allows programmers to define custom matching policies.
5.6 Request Stores
To correctly process incoming TradeAccept and TradeReject messages during trade negotiation (phase
II of the XChange trading protocol, see Section 4.2), XChange stores the state of outgoing TradeProposal
and Negotiate messages. The state of outgoing messages is stored in distinct request stores (coloured
yellow in Figure 7). For each outgoing message that has a state attached, a unique identifier is generated,
a new request store containing this identifier is created and the generated identifier is appended to the
outgoing message. Traders that receive a message with this identifier are required to include the same
identifier in their response message. Incoming response messages with an unknown identifier are discarded
and not processed further. Each request store can have an optional timeout, indicating the duration after
which the request store times out. On timeout of a request store, it is deleted, and the overlay logic is
notified about this event.
5.7 Match Priority Queue (MPQ)
After creating a new order, a trader can receive multiple Match messages from matchmakers within a
short period of time. A basic approach is to process incoming Match messages on a first-in-first-out
(FIFO) basis. However, this approach leaves the mechanism vulnerable to an attack where a malicious
matchmaker is the first to send a specific Match message with low quality to a trader, which is then
immediately processed by this trader. The trader might have received a better match from an honest
matchmaker if it would have waited longer before processing incoming Match messages.
This issue is addressed as follows: incoming Match messages for a specific order are first collected and
stored in MPQ, coloured purple in Figure 7. When a trader receives the first Match message for their
specific order O1, it creates a new match priority queue for O1. Each entry in the MPQ of order O1 is a
two-dimensional tuple (r,O2) where r indicates the number of retries, and O2 is the order that matches
with O1. Removing items from the matching queue is first based on r (item with a lower value of r have
a higher priority) and then based on the quality of the match (better matches have a higher priority).
The number of retries r in each entry (r,O2) indicates how many times we tried to negotiate a trade
with the creator of O2. This value is initially zero and incremented by one each time a trade proposal
is denied for the reason that a counterparty does not have any unreserved assets. Specifically, when a
trader receives a TradeReject message for this reason from the creator of O2 during trade negotiation
for his own order O1, it adds the entry (r + 1, O2) to the MPQ of O1.
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Before trade negotiation with a specific trader starts, incoming matches for each order are stored
in MPQ for some duration Wm, also called the match window. The value of Wm should be carefully
considered: a high value of Wm increases the probability of receiving good matches but adds to the order
completion time since a trader has to wait longer before sending out trade proposals. On the other hand,
decreasing the match window might lead to missing better matches. When the match window expires, a
trader removes an entry (r,O) from the MPQ, verifies the counterparty and sends out a ProposeTrade
message to the trader that created O when the the trader wishes to trade with the counterparty (also
see Section 4.2). Only when trade negotiation for an order fails or succeeds, the next entry is removed
from the appropriate MPQ if there is still trading opportunity for order O. If O is fulfilled, the MPQ
associated with O is deleted.
5.8 Blockchain Auditor
The blockchain auditor (coloured green in Figure 7) inspects the transactions that are stored on the
XChange blockchain and reports this information to the trade execution engine or the overlay logic.
Conceptually, it converts the information in transactions stored on the distributed ledger to domain-
specific knowledge that can be used by different components. For example, prior to trade negotiation
between two traders, the overlay logic invokes the blockchain auditor to determine whether a trader t
holds responsibility in an outstanding trade with another party (which is determined by inspecting the
transactions which involve t).
5.9 Trade Execution Engine
The trade execution engine manages and controls the trading process. It tracks the current state of a
specific trade and interacts with the XChange blockchain to store trade agreement, payment specifications
and trade finalizations.
5.10 Wallets
XChange organizes different types of assets within wallets. These wallets organize the information pro-
vided by external blockchain platforms (e.g., Bitcoin or Ethereum) in a generic manner. Wallets are
designed to store information on any digital asset such as cryptocurrencies or digital tokens. Wallets
expose functionality to transfer available assets to others, to query the current balance and to fetch past
transactions. Each wallet is uniquely identified by a wallet address, usually a public key. The addresses
of wallets where assets should be sent to are included in a Agreement transaction on the XChange
blockchain.
5.11 External Blockchain Platforms
As outlined in the protocol description, the XChange blockchain stores full trade specifications. XChange
interacts with external blockchain platforms, such as the Bitcoin or Ethereum platform, to transfer assets
to the counterparty. Specifically, wallets invoke operations to query external blockchain platforms whether
assets have been received, or to transfer assets.
6 Blockchain-based Accounting of Trade Specifications
The XChange trading protocol (see Section 4) requires a blockchain to store full trade specifications.
The popularity of blockchain technology has resulted in much interest to design and deploy distributed
ledgers with different scalability and security guarantees. In this section, we review different blockchain
organizations and show which structures synergies with the XChange trading protocol.
6.1 Traditional Blockchain Ledgers
In most traditional blockchain ledgers, there is a global consensus mechanism that periodically deter-
mines a leader amongst all consensus participants, or miners. This leader is then allowed to extend the
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blockchain with exactly one block. In the Bitcoin network, a new block is appended roughly every ten
minutes [24]. For Bitcoin and Ethereum, each miner in the network attempts to solve a computational
puzzle and the first miner to solve the puzzle can append a new block to the blockchain ledger (Proof-of-
Work). Verifying the correctness of a proposed solution is computationally efficient and can be performed
in O(1) time. The difficulty of the computational puzzle grows with the overall computing power of the
network. Other consensus mechanisms might select a leader based on the miner’s stake in the network
(Proof-of-Stake) or by election of a committee that produces blocks (Delegated Proof-of-Stake) [25]. For
XChange, and even within Internet-of-Things applications in general, we consider the usage of blockchain
ledgers secured by global consensus impractical for the following two reasons.4
1. Inefficient. Reaching a global, network-wide consensus is often an expensive process in terms of
CPU power, bandwidth usage and storage requirements. It negatively impacts the throughput of a
blockchain in terms of finalized transactions per second. The theoretical throughput of a blockchain
ledger is often bounded by a constant value. Gervais et al. found that global consensus mechanisms
based on computing power (Proof-of-Work) can achieve up to around 60 transactions per second
before security issues arise [26]. Considering the throughput needed to process payments at a global
scale, many blockchains are by far not scalable enough to provide viable alternatives for financial
use-cases such as asset marketplaces.
2. Transaction fees. To incentive participation in the consensus mechanism, miners are rewarded by
transaction fees. These transaction fees are covered by users that initiate a transaction. Depending
on the blockchain used by XChange, the transaction fees required to get the transactions included
during a trade might be relatively high, especially if a trader only desires to exchange a few assets
with relatively low value. Transaction fees potentially make asset trading with XChange a costly
process.
6.2 DAG-based Blockchains
As an attempt to increase the throughput of distributed ledgers, various platforms reorganize the struc-
ture of their blockchain and maintain a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) structure instead [27]. Notable
applications that deploy a DAG structure include IOTA, Nano and Dagcoin [28] [29]. Its distinguish-
ing property is that each transaction can be referenced by multiple other ones and as such, it forms a
DAG of transactions. Transactions in a DAG are linked, and each transaction verifies one or more prior
transactions.
Since DAG-based ledgers allow for more efficient and localized consensus models, we argue that
they are better suited for the accounting of trade specifications in XChange. However, many DAG-
based ledgers violate on decentralization. Since some implementations are not properly tested at scale
yet, appending transactions to the ledger is controlled by a centralized coordinator (e.g., IOTA). Other
implementations compromise on decentralization by assembling a fixed group of witness nodes that verify
transactions and include them in the ledger (e.g., Nano and Dagcoin). We specifically aim to avoid
authorities with leveraged permissions to prevent (strategic) censorship of the transactions that are
submitted to the XChange blockchain.
6.3 TrustChain: A Scalable Blockchain for Accounting
Based on the idea of DAG-based blockchains, Otte et al. designed and deployed TrustChain, a blockchain
that is optimized for lightweight, tamper-proof accounting of data elements [5]. The key idea is that
individuals maintain and grow their individual ledger with transactions they have initiated and have
been involved in. Individual ledgers are intertwined (i.e. entangled) with each other and form a DAG
structure. TrustChain does not aim to prevent fraud like the double spend attack but instead guarantees
eventual detection of such fraud. This yields superior scalability compared to other ledgers but allows
for the situation where some fraud targeted at the blockchain layer might go undetected for some time.
Individuals in TrustChain are not required to store all transactions in the network and might choose to
4Still, the XChange trading protocol can leverage any distributed ledger that is secured by global consensus and has
accounting capabilities.
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Figure 8: Recording transactions in TrustChain.
store different parts of the global DAG ledger. Consensus is only reached between interacting parties and
not on a global scale.
We argue that TrustChain is a suitable blockchain to use during the XChange trading protocol for the
following five reasons. First, it is a blockchain that is optimized for efficient and tamper-proof accounting
of generic data items within transactions. The accounting capabilities of TrustChain enable XChange to
securely persist trade specifications. Second, TrustChain does not require network-wide replication of all
transactions but enables individuals to selectively share parts of their individual ledger with others. This
highly reduces storage requirements and allows XChange to also run on devices with storage limitations.
Third, TrustChain does not require any trusted authority for the creation, validation, or storage of
transactions. This satisfies our requirement for decentralization, avoiding any reliance on trusted third
parties during the XChange trading protocol. Forth, the TrustChain structure is optimized for bilateral
interactions that are signed by two parties but also supports the creation of unilateral transactions. This
aligns well with the XChange trading protocol since several operations benefit from support for bilateral
transactions (e.g., trade agreements). Finally, TrustChain is already being used by various decentralized
applications that require scalable accounting [30]. At the time of writing, the global TrustChain ledger
contains over 64 million transactions, created by 41.098 unique identities.5
6.4 Recording TrustChain Transactions
We now outline how a transaction between two interacting users A and B is recorded in TrustChain,
see Figure 8. Figure 8a highlights one block containing a transaction between A and B. Each block
contains a single transaction (Tx ). A transaction is a generic description of any interaction between
users, for instance, making an agreement or recording a trade. Both transacting parties digitally sign
the transaction they are involved in by using any secure digital signing algorithm. These signatures are
included in the block and ensure that participation by both parties is irrefutable. It also confirms that
both parties agree with the transaction itself. Digital signatures can be effectively verified by others.
After all required signatures have been added to a record, the transaction is committed to the local
databases of the two interacting parties.
5http://explorer.tribler.org
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Figure 9: The TrustChain ledger, with seven blocks created by seven participants.
The security of stored blocks is improved by linking them together, incrementally ordered by creation
time. In particular, each block is extended with a description (hash) of the prior block. Each block
has a sequence number that indicates its position in the individual ledger. This yields the blockchain
structure as shown in Figure 8b. As a result, each user maintains their own local chain which contains all
transactions in which they have participated. This sets TrustChain apart from the structure of traditional
blockchains, where the entire network maintains a single, linear ledger.
Note how the blockchain structure in Figure 8b allows user A to modify blocks in their individual ledger
without being detected by others. In particular, A can reorder the blocks in its individual ledger since
validity can quickly be restored by recomputing all hashes. In most blockchain applications, the global
consensus mechanism prevents this kind of manipulation. TrustChain uses a more efficient approach:
each block is extended with an additional (hash) pointer that points to the prior block in the individual
ledger of the transaction counterparty. This is visualized in Figure 8c. Each block now has exactly two
incoming and two outgoing (hash) pointers, except for the last block in an individual ledger, which only
has two incoming pointers. Modifications of the individual ledger by A, like reordering or removing blocks,
can now be detected by a transaction counterparty. To prove this fraud, the transaction counterparty
reveals both the correct block and the invalid block created by A.
When two parties transact and create a block, their chains essentially become entangled. When users
initiate more transactions with others, it leads to the directed acyclic graph (DAG) structure as shown
in Figure 9. Figure 9 shows seven blocks, created by seven unique users. Each block is added to the
local chains of all parties involved in the transaction exactly once. For a more advanced analysis of the
technical specifications and security of TrustChain, we refer the reader to the original paper by Otte et
al. [5].
6.5 Improving TrustChain Scalability
According to Otte et al., TrustChain is designed to scale [5]. However, we identify that its design limits a
user to one pending block creation at once. The main issue is that the digital signature of the transaction
counterparty is required before a new block can be appended to an individual ledger (since the input for
the hash of each new block includes all signatures in the previous block). This enables an attack where
a malicious user can purposefully slow down the block creation of others by delaying the signing process
of a bilateral transaction it is involved in. It also limits the growth rate of individual ledgers and reduces
the overall scalability of TrustChain.
We contribute to TrustChain and improve its scalability by adding support for concurrent block
creation. The idea is to remove the requirement for a digital signature of the counterparty when appending
new blocks to an individual ledger. We believe that this concurrency is necessary since it allows traders
to engage in transactions with different parties while being engaged in a trade.
Our solution is visualized in Figure 8d. It shows a transaction between users A and B, initiated by A.
We partition a block in two parts, and each block partition is appended to the individual ledger of exactly
one party. Construction of a block between A and B now proceeds as follows: first, user A initiates a
transaction by constructing a block partition with the transaction content and its digital signature. User
A adds this block partition to its individual ledger immediately (note that it does not include the digital
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Figure 10: A part of the TrustChain ledger, storing an offer and request created by traders A and B
respectively, and full specifications of a finished trade between A and B.
signature of B). A now sends the block partition to B. If B agrees with the transaction, it signs the
block partition created by A, adds it to its individual ledger and sends his block partition (with their
signature) back to A. User A stores the block partition created by B in its local database. Participation
of both parties in this transaction can now be proven with both block partitions. This mechanism allows
users to be involved in multiple transactions and block constructions at once.
We further improve upon the TrustChain design and enable support for multi-party agreement, see
Figure 8e. By extending the number of pointers and signatures, we can securely record transactions
between more than two parties. Block partitions can now be represented as a tree, where the root node
is the block partition created by the transaction initiator. While we do not currently use this mechanism
in XChange, we believe this allows for more advance features like support for n-way trades [31].
6.6 Storing Trade Specifications on TrustChain
We now outline how trade specifications are stored within transactions on TrustChain. Figure 10 shows
a part of the TrustChain ledgers of traders A and B. It includes a sequence of transactions that indicate
a finished trade between A and B. Trade agreements, created during phase III in the XChange trading
protocol, are stored within a bilateral Agreement transaction which is digitally signed by both involved
traders. Individual payments are stored within bilateral Payment transactions. A Payment transaction
that indicates an asset transfer from trader A to B is only signed by A if the assets are successfully
transferred, and only signed by B if the assets are observed in one of their wallets. Finally, trade
finalizations are stored within bilateral TradeDone transactions.
Since the overhead of creating new TrustChain transactions is low, we also store offers and requests
as unilateral transactions. Figure 10 shows a Offer transaction, created by user A, and a Request
transaction, created by user B. Each of these transactions only contain a digital signature of its creator.
Note that new orders stored on individual ledger of a specific peer are not locked in time until this peer
initiates a bilateral transaction with another peer.
7 Implementation and Evaluation
We present the open-source implementation of XChange and an experimental evaluation. The evaluation
answers the following three questions: (1) what is the duration of a single trade when XChange is
deployed on low-resource devices? (2) How scalable is XChange in terms of throughput and bandwidth
usage when increasing the system load? And (3) how does the scalability of XChange compare with that
of state-of-the-art decentralized asset exchanges?
7.1 Implementation Details
We have implemented the XChange trading protocol and system architecture in the Python 3 program-
ming language. The implementation is open source and all software artifacts (source code, tests, and
documentation) are published on GitHub.6
6https://github.com/tribler/anydex-core
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Networking. We have built XChange on top of an existing networking library which provides the
functionality to devise decentralized overlay networks and has built-in support for authenticated network
communication, custom message definitions, and UDP hole punching.7 For efficiency reasons, the UDP
protocol is used for message exchange between peers. The XChange implementation uses request stores
to handle message timeouts and transmission errors.
Architecture. We have implemented all components of the XChange system architecture, presented
in Figure 7. Request stores are organized in a dictionary with the request identifiers as keys and the indi-
vidual request stores as values. The matching priority queue is implemented as a linked list that remains
sorted whenever new entries are added to it. Different order books are organized in a dictionary whose
keys are an asset pair, and the values are the individual order books. We provide both an implementation
of a basic order book and an implementation of a limit order book. The basic order book structure can
be used to store and match orders with any attributes. The limit order book is optimized to store asset
trading orders with pricing information and organizes orders with the same price in a so-called price level.
It traverses through the set of orders based on these price levels during order matching.
Wallets. Our implementation contains a Wallet base class that can be extended by programmers
to create wallets that store different types of assets. For testing purposes, we have implemented a
DummyWallet, which is used when executing the unit tests and when running our experiments. This wallet
does not interact with any settlement provider. For practical reasons, we also provide a BitcoinWallet
that invokes the bitcoinlib library to query Bitcoin balance or to transfer Bitcoin to other wallets.8 This
library communicates with full nodes operating in the Bitcoin network.
Policies. The implementation contains base classes for the different policies that XChange requires.
Developers can implement their own advanced policies by subclassing these base classes. For example,
programmers can add custom matching policies by subclassing the MatchPolicy class and by providing
an implementation of the match(order, order book) method. This method accepts the order being
matched and an order book as parameters and returns a list of orders that matches the passed order.
We provide an implementation of the price-time matching policy. This policy is used when matching
assets that contain a price expressed in terms of another asset. The experiments in this section use
this matching policy to match new orders. We implement and use a basic validation policy that checks
whether an incoming order has not expired yet. Finally, we provide a basic order dissemination policy
where a new order is sent to the same subset of matchmakers every time.
7.2 Trading on Low-resource Devices
The first experiment determines the total duration of a trade between two traders when running XChange
on low-resource devices.
Setup. This experiment is conducted with two hosted Raspberry Pis (3rd generation, model B+).
The devices run the Raspbian Stretch operating system and the Python 3.5 interpreter. Each device
creates an order, and the two created orders indicate mutual interest in a trade. One device assumes the
identity of trader A and the other device acts as trader B. To avoid the transmission of redundant Match
messages, only one of the two devices acts as a matchmaker. The experiment is executed in an isolated
environment: there is only network communication between the two Raspberry Pis. For this experiment,
we use two different subclasses of DummyWallet. We configure these wallet such that assets instantly
arrive when being transferred to another wallet. We do so to measure the overhead of XChange itself,
and not that of asset transfer operations.
During the experiment, we log the timestamp of several events. At t = 0, both orders are created. The
trade is finished when both trading parties have signed a TradeDone transaction and have committed
the transaction to their individual ledgers.
Results. Figure 11 shows a timeline of the events during a single trade between the two Raspberry
Pis. The full trade sequence, from the moment of order creation to mutual possession of a dual-signed
TradeDone transaction, completes in 493 milliseconds, less than half a second. Almost half of the trade
duration, 254 milliseconds, is spent in phase III of the XChange trading protocol, the trade negotiation
phase. During this phase, a trader determines whether a matched counterparty is already involved in
a trade by inspection of the entries in their TrustChain ledger. Note that at the start of the trade
7https://github.com/tribler/py-ipv8
8http://github.com/1200wd/bitcoinlib
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Figure 11: A timeline of the events during a single trade between two traders A and B. The experiment
is conducted on two hosted Raspberry Pis (3rd generation, model B+). The total duration of the trade
is 493 milliseconds.
negotiations, both traders have a single transaction in their individual TrustChain ledger, containing
specification of their created order.
Conclusion. This experiment shows that a full trade, including order creation, can be completed
within half a second on low-resource devices if asset transfer would be instant. Since orders are published
as unilateral transactions on TrustChain, order creation is almost instant. This duration is significantly
lower than the block creation times of state-of-the-art DEXes. For example, the average block creation
time of the NEM blockchain platform is around 60 seconds on average [32]. This means that it can take
up to a minute before a new order is confirmed on the NEM blockchain.
An implementation of XChange in a real Internet-of-Things environment would be viable since its
communication and transaction creation overhead is minimal compared to existing decentralized asset
trading marketplaces (see Section 7.3). However, our trading protocol requires periodic queries of other
blockchain ledgers during an ongoing trade. Since maintaining the full transaction history is not realistic
given the storage restrictions of IoT devices, XChange should rely on dedicated full nodes that maintain
synchronized with all transactions on a specific blockchain. We believe that devices with less processing
capabilities than the Raspberry Pis used during this experiment are capable of maintaining and securing
individual TrustChain ledgers. This should be verified with a small-scale deployment of XChange in an
IoT environment where blockchain-based assets are managed.
While the low trade duration on low-resource devices is a promising result, the experiment is not
representative of a realistic trading environment where there are many traders creating orders and ex-
changing assets simultaneously. Therefore, our next experiment focuses on the scalability of XChange
and reveals how our mechanism behaves under a higher system load.
7.3 Scalability of XChange
We now perform scalability experiments to quantity the performance of XChange as the system load and
network size increases.
Setup. To explore the limitations of XChange, we conduct scalability experiments on our university
cluster. The detailed specifications of the hardware and runtime environment can be found online.9 Our
infrastructure allows us to reserve computing nodes and deploy instances of XChange on each node. We
use the Gumby experiment framework to orchestrate the deployment of XChange instances onto com-
puting nodes and to extract results from experiment artifacts.10 The scalability experiment is controlled
by a scenario file, a chronologically ordered list of actions which are executed by all or by a subset of
running instances, at specific points in time after the experiment starts. Each run is performed at least
five times, and the results are averaged.
We increase the system load, namely the number of new orders being created every second. As the
system load grows, so does the number of traders in the network. With a system load of l new orders per
second, we deploy 0.5l XChange instances. We devise a synthetic dataset to determine the performance
of XChange under a predictable arrival rate of orders. In a network with n peers running XChange,
9https://www.cs.vu.nl/das5/
10https://github.com/tribler/gumby
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Figure 12: The peak throughput and order fulfil latencies as the system load increases.
n orders are created every half a second. Each peer alternates between the creation of an offer and a
request. To avoid the situation where all instances create new orders at the same time, the starting time
of this periodic order creation is uniformly distributed over all peers, based on their assigned IDs (ranging
from 1 to n). Each peer acts as a matchmaker and sends a new order to four matchmakers, which each
peer randomly selects when the experiment starts. The experiment lasts for 30 seconds, after which 60n
orders are created in total. We fix the price of each new offer and request to $1 and the asset quantities
to 1, to make matchmaking a predictable process. After 30 seconds, the experiment is terminated.
We test the scalability of XChange under a combination of different risk mitigation strategies. The
RESTRICT (t) policy denotes the policy where a trader will not trade with a counterparty that currently
holds responsibility in t or more ongoing trades (see Section 3.3). With the INC SET (n) policy, we refer
to the incremental settlement strategy where each trader makes n payments to the counterparty during a
single trade. We consider four experiment settings in total, with combinations of the RESTRICT (1) and
INC SET (2) policies, and when no risk mitigation policy is active. Scalability is measured as follows:
first, we analyse the peak throughput observed during the experiment, in terms of trades per second.
Second, we consider the average order fulfil latency, which is the time between the creation of an order
and the time until this order has been completed (the order creator has exchanged all assets as specified
in the order).
Results. The results of the scalability experiments are presented in Figure 12. We run each experi-
ment with a specific system load up to 1.000 deployed instances (which is close to the limitations of the
used hardware). Figure 12a shows how the peak throughput (expressed in trades per second, vertical
axis) behaves with respect to the system load (horizontal axis). All experiment settings hint at linear
scalability as the system load increases. Furthermore, enabling risk mitigation policies does not appear
to have a notable effect on the peak throughput. Experimentation on more compute nodes should reveal
whether this trend continues when the system load exceeds 2.000 new orders per second.
Figure 12b shows the average order fulfil latency when the system load increases, for the four evaluated
experiment settings. The average order fulfil latency remains largely constant when the system load
grows. Applying the restriction and incremental settlement policies increases the average order fulfil
latency, since more operations have to be performed to successfully complete an order. We observe that
there is a moderate increase of latency when applying the RESTRICT (1) + INC SET (2) policies when
the system load grows to 2.000 trades per second. The high system load is likely to increase the duration
of individual trades beyond 0.5 seconds, which means that the RESTRICT (1) policy prevents traders
from initiating a new trade with others. Since a trader now has to find a new party to trade with, the
average order fulfil latency increases.
Conclusion. The main finding of this experiment is that the throughput (trades per second) scales
linearly with respect to the system load and network size. We also observe that the average order fulfil
latency remains largely constant as the system load grows. Further experimentation should reveal whether
these trends continue with a higher order creation rate.
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7.4 Scalability comparison
We compare the scalability of XChange with that of state-of-the-art DEXes. This work is the first to
present a systematic scalability comparison between DEXes, to the best knowledge of the authors. For the
following experiment, we compare XChange with the BitShares and Waves DEXes respectively. BitShares
and Waves have attained significant market capitalization ($80 million and $83 million respectively),
and have employed consensus mechanisms that are fundamentally different compared to the TrustChain
blockchain used by XChange. We briefly discuss BitShares and Waves.
BitShares. BitShares enables users to issue, manage and trade their own assets, which are stored
on a single blockchain [12]. To coordinate block creation, BitShares uses the Delegated Proof-of-Stake
(DPoS) consensus mechanism [33]. DPoS utilizes approval voting to decide on a committee of so-called
witnesses. Witnesses are able to append a new block to the blockchain (produce a block), in a round-robin
fashion, and are rewarded by the sum of transaction fees in a block they have added to the ledger. If
a witness acts malicious, i.e. by deliberately failing to produce a new block, the witness will eventually
be removed from the committee by stakeholders. All orders are stored on the BitShares blockchain.
Matching of orders proceeds by a deterministic algorithm during transaction validation. Specifications
on resulting matches are not stored on the blockchain, to improve efficiency (but they can be deduced by
replaying transactions).
We compile BitShares version 3.3.2. During our experiments, we deploy a committee with 21 witnesses
that produce blocks, comparable to the committee in the BitShares mainnet at the time of writing. We
fix the block creation interval to five seconds.
Waves. Similar to BitShares, the Waves platform also allow users to create and manage custom
assets [11]. The adopted consensus mechanism is Waves-NG, a protocol that combines Proof-of-Stake and
Bitcoin-NG [34]. Although the blockchain in Waves is a decentralized data structure, order matchmaking
in Waves is largely centralized and traders submit new orders to a single matchmaking instance. The
submitted order can then only be matched with other orders this matchmaker knows about. When two
orders are matched by a matchmaker in Waves, the resulting assets are exchanged on the blockchain
and this trade is then recorded as a transaction. The matchmaker collects the transaction fees in both
matched orders.
We compile Waves version 1.1.5 and adopt all default settings when deploying a Waves development
network. To ensure a relatively quick block creation, the average time between creation of two blocks is
lowered to five seconds. We configure each deployed Waves instance to run a matchmaker. Each Waves
instance sends new orders to another Waves instance, which remains fixed throughput the experiment.
Setup. Similar to the prior experiment, we increase the system load and observe the peak throughput
and average order fulfil latency of each system. For each run with BitShares or Waves, we initiate the
experiment by starting a single BitShares/Waves instance, which creates two new types of digital assets
on the blockchain. This instance then transfers sufficient assets to all other instances, so they can create
new orders and trade these assets with others. When each instance has sufficient funds to create numerous
orders, they start to create a new order every half a second, for one minute in total. We adopt the same
synthetic workload as in the previous scalability experiment. For XChange, we enable the RESTRICT (1)
and INC SET (2) risk mitigation policies.
In the prior experiments, we have adopted the peak number of trader per second as our scalability
metric. In order to fairly compare the scalability between XChange, BitShares, and Waves, we modify
the throughput metric and quantify the peak number of operations per second observed during the
experiment. For BitShares, we count the number of operations included in a transaction. For Waves,
we consider a new transaction on the blockchain as a single operation. For XChange, we consider the
creation of a block in an individual ledger as a single operation.
Results. Figure 13 shows the scalability of XChange, BitShares and Waves. Figure 13a shows how
the peak throughput in terms of operations per second behaves as the system load increases. The peak
throughput of Waves does not exceed 89 operations per second. Furthermore, we observe that a majority
of the deployed Waves instances crashes due to memory limitations when increasing the system load to
300 new orders per second. The consensus mechanism of Waves is not able to keep up with the increasing
system load. Up to a system load of 400 new orders per second, BitShares shows a linear increase in peak
throughput. Surprisingly, when the system load exceeds 400 new orders per second, peak throughput
grows faster. We found that BitShares has issues keeping up with a higher load, and the inclusion of orders
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Figure 13: The peak throughput and order fulfil latencies of XChange, BitShares and Waves, as the
system load increases.
in the BitShares blockchain might be deferred. Even though the system load is predictable throughout
the experiment, the number of transactions inside new blocks on the BitShares blockchain becomes more
uneven when the system load grows. Figure 13a reveals that XChange exhibits a near-linear increase in
peak throughput. The TrustChain ledger as used by XChange achieves the creation of 7.000 new blocks
(operations) per second.
Figure 13b shows the average order fulfil latency of XChange, BitShares and Waves as the system
load increases. The order fulfil latency of Waves increases up to almost 48 seconds, and then starts to
decline. Up to a system load of 400 new orders per second, BitShares shows an average order fulfil latency
of around 2.5 seconds. This is expected since the block creation interval is fixed to five seconds and on
average, it takes 2.5 seconds for a new order to be fulfilled. When the system load grows, so does the
average order latency, confirming our finding that the inclusion of incoming orders in a block becomes a
less predictable process. Finally, note how the average order fulfil latency of XChange remains sub-second
during this experiment.
Conclusion. XChange, in combination with the TrustChain ledger, shows excellent scalability com-
pared to the BitShares and Waves DEXes. At this point, we should note that TrustChain, unlike BitShares
and Waves, does not incorporate global consensus and therefore has different security guarantees. Also,
during this experiment we assume that XChange assets are exchanged instantly between trading parties,
which is done to quantify the limitations of XChange. In reality, a trader most likely has to wait one or
more block creation intervals in order to guarantee that a payment is finalized. This further adds to the
order fulfil latency.
8 Related Work
In this section we report on literature related to the problem domain of XChange. For an extensive
discussion on the usage of blockchain-based systems in IoT, we refer the readers to [35] and [36]. We
first report on two features related to XChange, namely 1) auctioning, and 2) decentralizing blockchain-
based marketplaces. We then inform of studies that implement decentralized accountability without
network-wide (global) consensus.
Auctioning. The act of matching traders in XChange is closely related to the auctioning problem,
where buyers and sellers make bids for a specific asset and eventually determine the price of that asset.
Considerable effort has been spent on the decentralization of the auctioning process, which is the act of
conducting an auction without trusted third parties [37, 38, 39, 40]. In [37], the authors use so-called
law governed interaction to define rules for auctioning. Their framework assumes a single asset type and
regulates only one side of the trade, namely sellers. In [38], traders regularly broadcast their (buy or sell)
prices to all peers in the network and wait for answers from all interested peers. This is an inefficient way
of communication since it floods the network with messages. Advanced solutions use so called brokers
to pre-aggregate market information. Brokers are similar to matchmakers in the XChange protocol. In
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[39], peers build clusters and select one leader to be the broker for a specific cluster. Selecting the cluster
sizes raises a trade-off between effectiveness of trade and scalability. In PeerMart, a set of brokers is
selected deterministically for each service to be traded [40]. However, full synchronization among brokers
causes significant communication overhead in PeerMart. We note that our XChange trading protocol
considers asynchronous operation of matchmakers, without the need for round synchronization. Unlike
all decentralized auctioning protocols mentioned above, XChange also involves the execution of a trade
(the actual asset exchange).
Blockchain-based marketplaces. XChange assumes the availability of a blockchain to record trade
specifications. There have been substantial amount of attempts to design marketplaces that leverage the
features of distributed ledgers. Beaver combines the features of a public ledger-based consensus protocol
and an anonymous payment system for building a privacy-preserving e-commerce system [41]. Similar to
XChange, all marketing activity, as well as payments, are stored on a distributed ledger. However, Beaver
relies on network-wide consensus on the ledger, while our protocol supports any distributed ledger that
has accounting capabilities. In [42], authors present Desema, a prototype for trading software services.
Instead of service metadata, it stores references to trade data in the ledger. Desema assumes bipartite
relationship between users, as each user can either be a service provider or consumer. FairSwap considers
the fair exchange of digital goods [43]. It uses smart contracts which are stored in and managed by
distributed ledgers. FairSwap has strong synchronization requirement where every peer in the network is
aware of the actual round. All the works mentioned in this section up to this point consider the trade of
goods or services with using a specific asset type (such as Bitcoin) as the medium of exchange. XChange,
however, is designed for the trade of any asset types.
Accountability-oriented distributed ledgers. XChange supports distributed ledgers which do
not rely on network-wide (global) consensus for providing accountability. PeerReview maintains local
records of messages and guarantees that deviation of a peer from expected behaviour is eventually de-
tected [44]. TrustChain uses a similar approach to design a blockchain data structure and provides
tamper-proofness by the entanglement of local transaction records [5]. Ongoing research justifies the
integrity of these approaches by proving that one does not need consensus to implement a decentralized
accounting mechanism [45].
9 Conclusions
We have presented XChange, a blockchain-based mechanism for generic asset trading in resource-constrained
environments. The key idea is to account full trade specifications on a blockchain. XChange is generic
since it can facilitate cross-chain trade without relying on special transaction types. Moreover, XChange
is decentralized since it does not rely on trusted third parties to mediate in the trading process, and
to bring traders together. Finally, by careful inspection of the ongoing trades involving a potential
trade counterparty, we have limited the effectiveness of counterparty fraud conducted by adversaries.
Incremental settlement further reduces counterparty risk by splitting each payment into multiple smaller
ones.
With an open-source implementation and an experimental evaluation, we have demonstrated the
viability of trading on devices with low hardware capabilities. A single trade can be completed within half
a second if asset transfers on external blockchain platforms would complete instantly. With a scalability
experiment at scale, we achieved over 1.000 trades per second and found that the throughput of XChange
in terms of trades per second scales linearly with the system load and network size. Finally, we have
compared the scalability of XChange with that of the state-of-the-art DEXes BitShares and Waves, and
conclude that XChange exhibits superior scalability.
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